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Newman: New York's New Ethics Law: Turning the Tide on Corruption

NEW YORK'S NEW ETHICS LAW: TURNING
THE TIDE ON CORRUPTION
Robert C. Newman*
Earl Long, scion of the famous Longs of Louisiana, once was
asked if he believed in using "ethics" in government. "Hell, yes," he
replied, "I believe in using anything I can get my hands on." 1
Revelations of recent years have made it appear that "anything
goes" is the motto of a number of New York's public figures as well.
From Hempstead 2 to Syracuse,3 one official after another has been
convicted of betraying the public trust. Most of these convictions occurred in the federal courts, where anti-racketeering laws facilitate
the prosecution of systemic corruption. As a result, many observers
questioned the state government's ability to maintain and uphold
standards of official conduct.
In 1987, responding to intense pressure from the public, the
news media, and Governor Cuomo, New York's legislature adopted
the Ethics in Government Act." This landmark law, the first overhaul of the state's ethics codes in two decades, will prohibit state
officials, employees, and lawmakers from representing private parties
in state agency proceedings, and will require them to make detailed
* B.A. Carleton College, 1969; J.D. New York University, 1972; Chairman, New York
State Common Cause, 1986-88.
1. Address by Ann McBride, Senior Vice-President, Common Cause, Common Cause
State Leadership Conference (Sept. 20, 1986).
2. Nassau Republican leader Joseph Margiotta was convicted of extortion relating to a
kickback scheme involving the County's insurance business. Lubasch, Jury, in 2d Trial,Finds
Margiotta Guilty of Fraud,N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1981, at Al, col. 5; see United States v.
Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). He was also found
civilly liable for requiring Nassau County workers to contribute a portion of their salaries to
the Republican Party. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct.
3266 (1987).
3. Lee Alexander, former Democratic mayor of Syracuse, admitted being a central figure in a plot to collect millions of dollars in kickbacks from City contractors. Lynn, Ex-Syracuse Mayor's Schemes Detailed in Memo, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, § 1, at 38, col. 1.
4. Ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.Y.
EXEC. LAW; N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW; N.Y. JUD. LAW; N.Y. LEGIs. LAW; N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW).
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annual disclosures of their financial interests.5
While recognizing that no statute can instantly and permanently cleanse the body politic of corrupt behavior, sponsors and supporters of the Ethics Act hope that it will encourage a moral climate
in which integrity is expected and demanded by the voting public.6
At the same time, the Ethics Act greatly strengthens the mechanisms by which the State can deter, detect and punish those officials
who prove unable, or unwilling, to draw the line between their private interests and their public responsibilities.
This Article sets forth the basic principles at stake in the drafting of government ethics laws, and will sketch how these laws have
emerged at the federal level and in other jurisdictions. It then
presents the major features of the 1987 Ethics Act, including its
scope and coverage, its substantive restrictions on officials' behavior,
its disclosure requirements, and its enforcement provisions. Finally,
this Article comments on proposed amendments to the Act, intended
to extend the Ethics Act's reach and strengthen its regulatory weave.
I.

BASIC PURPOSES OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION

As government has grown larger and its regulations more pervasive, laws governing the conduct of public officials have also become
much more elaborate than the simple anti-bribery statutes of earlier
eras. The goals of such laws have generally been described as: (1)
avoiding favoritism in government's consideration of citizens' claims;
(2) preserving the integrity of the policy-making process; (3) enhancing public confidence in government; (4) improving government
efficiency; and (5) preventing the use of public office for private
gain. 8 Instead of relying solely on ad hoc determinations of propriety, reformers have preferred to prohibit officials from engaging in
certain relationships that pose the potential for breaches of trust, on
the theory that "situations of temptation should not be put in the
way of human beings in high authority."' Typical of such relation5. Id. at 1406-08.
6. See, e.g., Sponsor's Memorandum in Support of N.Y.A. 1202 (Jan. 14, 1987); Governor's Program Bill No. 220 (1986).
7. See ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404.
S. Perkins, Conflict of Interest in the Executive Branch, in CONFERENCE ON CONFLICT
OF INTEREST, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 69 (1961); see also Report and Recommendations on Conflict of Interest and Financial Disclosure Requirements, in 1 THE STATECITY COMMISSION ON INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT: REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1987)
[hereinafter SOVERN COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS] (chaired by Michael I. Sovern).
9. Rauh, Conflict of Interest in Congress, in CONFERENCE ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST,
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ships are a government official selling goods or services to the agency
that employs him; an official taking employment that would permit
him to use "inside" knowledge and connections to the advantage of
his employer and to the disadvantage of competitors; and an official
receiving gifts, other income, or property from outside entities that
have an interest in his official actions.
Another aspect of current legal thinking in the ethics area takes
its cue from Justice Brandeis' admonition that "Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most effective policeman." 10 By requiring public disclosure of officials' financial holdings
and sources of income, it is argued that citizens will have the information necessary to judge whether their representatives are acting in
the public interest rather than for private gain. In spite of opponents'
fears that government recruitment of talented professionals will be
hampered," financial disclosure laws have been enacted in numerous
12
jurisdictions.
Disclosure laws and "prophylactic" measures against conflict of
interest each work best when applied in combination. Injunctions
against impropriety are more easily enforced, and impropriety itself
is deterred when financial disclosure is required. Most officials will
draw back from ethically ambiguous conduct when they realize that
truthful disclosures might generate scandal, while concealment risks
discovery and prosecution. On the other hand, disclosure alone risks
becoming "a symbolic act that increasingly becomes devoid of meaning" unless it stimulates public debate and provides the impetus for
the further development of substantive conflict of interest
standards.' 3
Crucial to any set of ethics laws is the enforcement mechanism.
Laws work best when their implementation is entrusted to a specially
designated agency that is committed to the laws' purposes. In the
case of ethics laws, such an agency should be bipartisan and independent, beyond the direct control of any of the officials whose conduct is being monitored. As will be shown, the failure to create one
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL

4 (1961).

10. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1932).
11. See Jacobs, Ethics Act Prompts AG Staff Defections, 39 MANHATTAN LAW.

1

(1988) (stating that "[t]he impetus for the departures is the law's so-called revolving-door
section ... which prohibits lawyers from appearing before their former agencies for two years
after they have left the government").
12. See infra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
13. R. VAUGHAN, CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST REGULATION IN THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE
BRANCH 53 (1979).
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single independent enforcement agency represents one of the few
major weaknesses of the New York Ethics Act. 4
II.

EXPERIENCE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

A. Federal Government
The federal Ethics in Government Act,15 adopted in 1978, is in
many ways a model conflict-of-interest statute. Public disclosures are
required of high-level employees in all branches of government.16 Executive branch employees are subject to stringent restrictions against
post-employment lobbying of their former agencies;"7 these restrictions are currently undergoing their first major tests in the Lyn
Nofziger' 8 and Michael Deaver cases.19 Receipt of gifts from lobbyists is strictly limited, and the well-known "special prosecutor law" is
meant to ensure vigorous enforcement.2"
The weaknesses of the federal law, weaknesses it shares with
many state enactments, are found in its application to the legislative
branch. Members of Congress are allowed to receive considerable
sums in honoraria and travel reimbursements from groups with an
interest in legislation 2 and are allowed to own stock in industries
14. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text; see also SOVERN COMMIssIoN REcsupra note 8, at 47 (recommending the creation of a single permanent, independent Commission on Ethics in Government to enforce the conflict of interest and financial
disclosure law).
15. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.; 5 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C.; 26 U.S.C.; 28 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
16. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1982) (financial disclosure requirements for legislative
personnel); 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 201-212 (1982) (financial disclosure requirements for executive
personnel); 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301-309 (1982) (financial disclosure requirements for judicial
personnel).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18. See In re Nofziger, No. 87-1 (D.C. Cir. Independent Counsel Division).
19. See In re Deaver, No. 86-2 (D.C. Cir. Independent Counsel Division).
20. Congress Faces an Ethics Gap, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1988, at 16, 16-17; see 28
U.S.C. §§ 592-596 (1982); see also Morrison v. Olson, 56 U.S.L.W. 4835 (U.S. June 28,
1988) (upholding the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act); Taylor, Supreme Court Vote Upholds Law on Special Prosecutors;7-I Ruling is Rebuff to Reagan, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
21. See Kaplan, Join Congress,See the World, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Sept.-Oct. 1986,
at 17. For example,
[i]n 1986 the United Coal Co. invited several congressmen to its headquarters
in Bristol, Va. They flew out in the company's corporate jet, toured the company
mines, dined with company executives - and were each given $2,000. Assistant
Attorney General William Weld, newly arrived in Washington, sent a memo to his
staff proposing to indict the congressmen for illegally accepting gratuities. His staff
sent a memo back: "Welcome to Washington. Members of Congress are exempt
from the antigratuities statue."
OMMENDATIONS,
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that fall under the jurisdiction of their committees.22 Nevertheless,
Congress has gone further than most state legislatures by treating its
members as "full-time" public servants and placing some limits on
the amount of outside honoraria that may be earned. 3
B. Other States
Virtually every state has anti-bribery statutes and laws restricting public officials and employees from certain activities.24 New
York was an early leader in the enactment of ethics legislation in
1954,25 but many other states and municipalities adopted more comprehensive provisions in the 1970's6 while calls to reform the New
York statute went unheeded. 7 Many states have enacted language
restricting officials from representing clients before public agencies,
for example.2 8
In 1978, Massachusetts strengthened existing ethics statutes in
response to a citizens' initiative petition. 9 Officials are prohibited
Congress Faces an Ethics Gap, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1988, at 16-17.
22. See Kaplan, Taking Stock, COMMON CAUSE MAG., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 29.
23. Both houses, by statute, have placed limits on members' speaking fees and other
honoraria. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 31-1 (West Supp. 1988) (amending 2 U.S.C. § 31-1 (1982)).
Only the House, however, has limited members' permissible outside earned income of all types.
See House Rule 47, in U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ETHICS MANUAL FOR MEMBERS,
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES (1987).
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 67-68 (Deering 1988) (bribery of administrative
officers and asking for or receiving bribes by public officers or employees); DEL CONST. art. II,
§ 22 (dealing with bribery of executive, judicial, or legislative officers); FLA. STAT. § 110.122
(1986) (discussing bribery of employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 562C (1987) (extortion
by state or local officer or employees).
25. See Staff Report on Conflict of Interest and Financial Disclosure Law in Government, in 2 THE STATE-CITY COMMISSION ON INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT: STAFF MEMORANDA
47 (1987) [hereinafter SOVERN COMMISSION STAFF REPORT]; NEW YORK SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON INTEGRITY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT. REPORT (1954).
26. See SOVERN COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at 47-48; seee.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A (West Supp. 1987) (ethics and financial disclosure); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 65, §§ 401-413 (conflicts of interest).
27. See SOVERN COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at 2, 47-54; Ethics, and
Anger, in New York, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1986, at B6, col. 1.
28. COMMON CAUSE, CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 6 (1987)
[hereinafter CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION]; see also NATIONAL CIVIC LEAGUE,
MODEL STATE CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAW (1979); S. SCHNEIDER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, ETHICS AND LOBBY LAW BLUE BOOK 51-59 (1986).
29. See MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 268A (West Supp. 1988) (Code of Ethics); id. at
268B (Financial Disclosure). Although Massachusetts has strengthened the ethical guidelines
for public officials and established an independent commission, difficulties persist in achieving
the desired goals. See Craven v. State Ethics Comm'n, 390 Mass. 191, 454 N.E.2d 471
(1983)(holding that the State Ethics Comm'n had statutory authority to act as the primary
investigatory body in cases of alleged violations of the conflict-of-interest law and financial
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from acting as agents for any private person whose interests are adverse to the State's. 30 They are forbidden from having any substantial financial interest in any business dealings with the State.31 Gifts
are restricted 2 and so are appearances before state agencies, 3 although only to a limited extent. Post-employment restrictions are in
place, 4 as are financial disclosure rules for officials and their
spouses.3 5 Local officials are also covered. 36 Somewhat unusual
among ethics statutes is language restricting an official's business
partner from engaging in representational activity that the official
himself could not engage in,37 and language prohibiting the "steering" of government insurance business arising from construction contracts to particular brokers. 38 Most importantly, the law is enforced
by an independent Ethics Commission of five members, three appointed by the Governor, one by the Secretary of State and one by
the Attorney General, all for five-year non-renewable terms.3 9 The
Commission has jurisdiction over ethics matters in all branches of
government, and its adjudicatory proceedings are normally public.40
The constitutionality of the financial disclosure component of
state laws has been tested in a number of states. Most courts have
held that where the laws are carefully drafted they are valid, on the
ground that the privacy interests of officials are outweighed by the
more compelling public interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. 1
disclosure law); Saccone v. State Ethics Comm'n, 395 Mass. 326, 480 N.E.2d 13 (1985) (holding that the State Ethics Comm'n lacked the power to enforce a provision which prohibits an
officer or employee of a state, county, or municipal agency from using or attempting to use his
official position to secure unwarranted privileges).
30.

MAss. GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 268A, § 4(c) (West Supp. 1988).

31. Id. § 7 (restricting state employees from having financial interests in contracts of
state agencies).
32. Id. § 4 (establishing criminal penalties for receiving compensation or gifts, directly
or indirectly in relation to any particular state matter).
33. Id. § 5.
34. Id.
35. Id. ch. 268B.
36. Id. ch. 268A, §§ 17-18.
37. Id. § 5(c)-(d).
38. Id. § 8.
39. MASS. GEN. LAw ANN. ch. 268B, § 2 (West Supp. 1988).

40. Id. § 3.
41.

See, e.g., County of Nevada v. MacMillan, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal.

Rptr. 345 (1974); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974); see generally Note,
The Constitutionalityof FinancialDisclosure Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 345 (1974); Annotation, Validity and Construction of Orders and Enactments Requiring Public Officers and
Employees, or Candidatesfor Office, to Disclose FinancialCondition, Interests, or Relation-
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C. Local Governments
Comprehensive local ethics legislation is less common, but Austin, Texas4 2 and Chicago, Illinois43 are two cities that have recently
adopted strong ordinances. In New York, local governments have
long had the authority to enact ethics codes that go beyond state
requirements. 44 For example, New York City has banned City officials from representing private parties before City agencies and requires financial disclosures.45 Many other jurisdictions have adopted
codes that build and improve upon the state's minimum standards,
but it would appear that most of the local codes are incomplete and
imprecise by comparison to the State's new ethics act." As will be
seen, some portions of the Ethics Act are made to apply to local
governments, and the question of applying further provisions at the
local level, where corruption historically has been most notorious, is
ships, 22 A.L.R.4TH 237 (1983).
42. Austin, Tex., Ordinance No. 860717-X (July 17, 1986) (amending AUSTIN, TEX.,
CODE ch. 2-3 (1981)). The Ethics Review Commission created by the ordinance has jurisdiction over the City Council as well as the executive branch. The commission is formed in a
rather unique manner - one Commission member is nominated by the mayor, and each of the
six members of the City Council nominates one Commission member. See id. § 2-3-27(b).
43. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 26.2 (1987). One unusual provision prohibits nepotism in city service, see id. ch. 26.2-13, a traditionally endemic species of Chicago corruption.
Another strong provision bars officials from receiving any gifts from persons with a financial
interest in specific city business. But a last-minute compromise before enactment stripped the
independent enforcement agency of jurisdiction over members of the Chicago City Council.
See id. ch. 26.2-37.
44. See Belle v. Town of Onondaga, 61 A.D.2d 352, 402 N.Y.S.2d 677 (4th Dep't
1978); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 806 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
45. NEW YORK, N.Y., CITY CHARTER § 2604 (1986); NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE,
ch. 49, § 1106-5.0 (1986); see Hunter v. City of New York, 58 A.D.2d 136, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186
(1st Dep't 1977) (upholding the constitutionality of an anti-corruption law which required
financial disclosure by New York City employees earning more than $25,000).

46. See, e.g., NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 22-4.2 (1964) (Nassau County
Code of Ethics); SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., CHARTER art. XXX (1980) (Suffolk County Code of
Ethics). Both codes are substantially stronger than the New York State General Municipal
Law; Nassau's has particularly specific provisions on representation of private persons in dealings with the County, and on gifts to officials from persons with a financial interest in County
business. Neither, however, requires detailed annual financial disclosures and consequentially
both remain incomplete.
It should be noted that a special committee, appointed by the Presiding Officer of the
County Legislature, has proposed a stronger ethics code for Suffolk. See SUFFOLK COUNTY,
N.Y., CHARTER art. XXX (1980). In addition, the New York State Commission on Government Integrity recently drafted a proposed ethics act that would set minimum conflict-of-interest standards for all municipalities in the state. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, DRAFT OF PROPOSED ETHICS ACT FOR NEW YORK STATE MUNICIPALITIES

(May 23, 1988) [hereinafter

FEERICK COMMISSION DRAFT].
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one of the major issues left in the wake of the Ethics Act's passage.
III.

THE

1987 ETHICS

IN GOVERNMENT ACT

A. PriorLaw
Prior to the Ethics Act, New York law barred state officers and
employees, legislators and legislative employees from involvement in
"contingent fee" arrangements with private clients where the earning of a fee would be dependent on state agency actions; from appearing for compensation on behalf of another, against the interests
of the state; from selling goods or services in excess of $25 to the
state in the absence of competitive bidding; and from using confidential information for private gain." These prohibitions also applied to
partnerships and corporations in which the officer, employee or legislator owned or controlled 10% or more of the stock.49 In addition, a
"code of ethics" warned state employees against any personal financial involvement in activities "in substantial conflict with the proper
discharge of [their] duties in the public interest." 50 The code also
instructed an employee to avoid "other employment which will impair his independence of judgment in the exercise of his official duties" and generally to "pursue a course of conduct which will not
raise suspicion among the public that he is likely to be engaged in
acts that are in violation of his trust."'5 Bribe-receiving by legislators
and their employees was specifically prohibited.52
Limited post-employment rules prevented former employees,
within two years after termination of service, from appearing before
their former agency in connection with matters in which the employee personally participated during his government service, and
prevented former legislators from lobbying the Legislature within
two years after leaving.53 Financial disclosure was required only
47. See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
48.

N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (amended 1987).

49. Id.
50.

N.Y. PUB. OFF.

51.

Id.

LAW

§ 74(a) (McKinney 1988).

52. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 75-77 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (amended 1987); see People
v. Hochberg, 87 Misc. 2d 1024, 386 N.Y.S.2d 740, affid, 62 A.D.2d 239, 404 N.Y.S.2d 161

(3d Dep't 1978). As originally enacted, § 76 also barred "vote-trading" among legislators, a
practice that few would consider felonious. The drafters of the 1987 Ethics Act discreetly

deleted this clause. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 76 (McKinney 1988) (modifying the existing
statute such that "vote-trading" among legislators is no longer explicitly barred, but continu-

ing a ban upon the outright sale of votes).
53.

N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(7) (McKinney Supp. 1986) (amended 1987).
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where the entity in which the official or member of his household
had an interest was "subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory
agency," unless the official determined "in his discretion" that this
interest "might reasonably be expected to be particularly affected by
legislative action. ' 54 The specific value of financial interests did not
have to be disclosed. 5
No enforcement agency existed except an Advisory Committee
on Ethical Standards in the Attorney General's office, whose purpose
was to issue advisory opinions on the application of the ethics code. 6
Criminal prosecutions for violation of the conflict-of-interest rules
were possible, but rarely attempted.5
B. Legislative History
The Ethics Act had its genesis in bills that were championed for
some time by Assemblyman G. Oliver Koppell (D-Bronx), Assemblyman Alexander Grannis (D-Manhattan), and Senator Franz
Leichter (D-Manhattan), 58 but made no legislative headway until
Governor Cuomo made ethics legislation a personal priority in the
wake of the scandals that rocked New York City throughout 1986. 5a
The Assembly first passed a strong bill late in the 1986 session, but
the Senate did not act until the following year. 0
54. Id. § 73(6).
55. Id.
56. N.Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 63(11), 74 (McKinney 1982).
57. Compare People v. Zambuto, 73 A.D.2d 828, 423 N.Y.S.2d 770 (4th Dep't 1979)
(holding that the acceptance of home repairs by a public officer was insufficient to support a
conviction of receiving unlawful gratuities but adequate to support a violation of Public Officers Law § 73 despite a lack of proof that the gifts were intended to influence the defendant
in the performance of his official duties) with People v. de Roos, 118 Misc. 2d 445, 462
N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (requiring that the unlawful conduct have a particular effect on
the performance of the public officer in order to sufficiently meet the jurisdictional requirements for a criminal violation).
58. See N.Y.A. 1202, 210th Sess. (1987) (initial version of the Ethics in Government
Act introduced in the New York Assembly by members of the Assembly Koppell, Miller,
Nadler and Dugan, subsequently adopted as Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y.
Laws 1404); N.Y.A. 715, N.Y.S. 595, 208th Sess. (1985) (introduced by Senator Leichter in
the New York Senate); N.Y.A. 13161, 201st Sess. (1978) (introduced by Assemblyman A.
Grannis).
59. See Uhlig, Albany Lawmakers Fume Over Fight on Ethics Code, N.Y. Times, Apr.
16, 1987, at B2, col. 1; Schmalz, New York's Legislature Tightens Ethics Rules in an Air of
Tension, Apr. 8, 1987, at A1, col. 1; Cross, Cuomo Proposes Stiffer Ethic Laws for Politicians, Albany Times-Union, Apr. 29, 1986, at Al, col. 2; Gross, Cuomo Presents Legislative
Plan to Combat Graft, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
60. See N.Y.S. 4661, N.YA.. 7239, 210th Sess. (1987). The Senate bill was accepted by
the Assembly and passed both houses on April 7, 1987, but was vetoed a week later by Governor Cuomo, who maintained that it was too weak. See Ublig, Albany Lawmakers Fume Over
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According to its Assembly sponsors, the Act was intended to
maintain public trust and confidence by strengthening "prohibitions
against behavior which may permit or appear to permit undue influence and broadening financial disclosure requirements to assure that
the public is aware of all private and business interests which may
influence public officials in their official acts. 61 The Ethics Act significantly improved upon existing law in the areas of (1) appearances
before state agencies;62 (2) post-employment restrictions;6 3 (3) financial disclosure;64 (4) coverage of certain political party leaders;6 5 and
(5) administration and enforcement. 6
C. Provisions of the Act
1. Appearances Before State Agencies.- Many government officials, particularly legislators who are also lawyers, have engaged
extensively in practices involving the receipt of compensation for the
rendition of services or appearance on behalf of private parties in
various types of proceedings before state agencies. This practice is
disturbing for at least two reasons. First, it places officials who draft
statutes and administrative rules in the position of being able to look
out for their own interests and their clients' interests while they are
ostensibly concerned only with serving the public. This conflict is especially apparent when a legislator plays a key role on a committee
with jurisdiction over a particular area of regulation. Second, the
appearances of legislators before state agencies give rise to a perception that favoritism may come into play because the legislators control the agency officials' livelihoods, i.e., their budgets. Beyond this,
there has been general discomfort with the intuitive but widely
shared belief that it is the lure of special access and the desire to
curry favor, and not professional competence, that attracts clients to
retain public officials as their personal representatives.
Fight on Ethics Code, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1987, at B2, col. 1; Schmalz, New York's Legislature Tightens Ethics Rules in an Air of Tension, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
61. Sponsor's Memorandum in Support of N.Y.A. 1202 (Jan. 14, 1987); cf.Salant, The
Company They Keep, CAPITAL REGION, Apr. 1987, at 24 (detailing potential conflicts of interest by state legislators who sit on numerous corporate and health care institution boards, or
retain financial interests in partnerships and investments which might be affected by decisions
by lawmakers).
62. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
65, See infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 122-48 and accompanying text.
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The final version of the Ethics Act 7 addressed this problem by
preventing appearances68 before state agencies in connection with:
(i) the purchase, sale, rental or lease of real property, goods or services; (ii) rate-making; (iii) adoption or repeal of regulations; (iv)
obtaining of grants or loans; (v) licensing; or (vi) franchises.6 9 Appearances before administrative hearing officers in "quasi-judicial"
proceedings, excluded from an earlier version of the Act, are now
encompassed within the prohibition. What the Act does not prohibit,
aside from the expected exclusions for appearances in "ministerial
matters" and public advocacy on behalf of constituents, are appearances before courts, and appearances before (or negotiations with)
the Attorney General in his prosecutorial and investigatory functions; indeed, civil and criminal prosecutions generally appear to be
the major area in which the restrictions do not apply.7
Once the decision was made to prevent officials from practicing
before state agencies, the question naturally arose as to whether it
was proper for the officials' partners and associates to practice before
the state agencies. According to the American Bar Association's
Code of Professional Responsibility, representation by any member
of a firm is equivalent to representation by the entire firm; 7 1 thus,
the Code on its face would seem to require that the statutory ban
apply to the official's partner. To a member of the public concerned
about the appearance of undue influence, this seems eminently logical. However, a far greater number of lawmakers are associated with
firms that appear before state agencies than the number who have
commonly appeared before state agencies themselves. Indeed, state
regulation is so extensive that it would be difficult for any firm with
a large, business-oriented practice to avoid involvement in state
agency matters. Placing a ban on partners' practice before agencies
would, in effect, require many covered officials to resign from their
firms, and would in all likelihood be a prelude to a declaration that
67. N.Y.S. 6441, N.Y.A. 8528, 210th Sess. (1987) (subsequently enacted as the Ethics
in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404).
68. "Appearance" is broadly defined by the statute to include any "appearance or rendition of services ... in relation to [a] case, proceeding, application or other matter." N.Y. PUB.
OFF. LAW § 73(7)(a) (McKinney 1988).
69. Id.

70. See Attorney General's Legislative Program No. 160, at 3 (1988) (memorandum of
Attorney General Robert Abrams in support of Program Bill 149).

71.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 5-105(D) (1982). The ABA's

Committee on Professional Ethics, foreseeing this problem, has suggested that it would be
proper to waive the rule in certain circumstances. See R. VAUGHAN, supra note 13, at 80.
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legislators are to be considered "full-time", with higher government
salaries but strict limits on the amount of outside earned income
they may receive. The Legislature is not yet willing to take this
step.72 Accordingly, a compromise was developed which permits officials' firms to appear before and transact business with state agencies so long as the official himself does not share in the "net revenues" resulting from such business.73 As an added precaution, the
official whose firm is "appearing" before an agency may not "orally
communicate" with the agency, even without compensation, about
the merits of the case.7 4 The Legislative Ethics Committee is
charged with developing guidelines regarding the calculation of the
portion of a firm's profits that are attributable to practice before
state agencies;7 5 in the meantime, a legislator is safe from disciplinary action if he "reasonably believes, in good faith" that he is not
sharing in the "net revenues" from state agency practice.7 6 Finally,
any official complying with these rules is immune from any disciplinary actions under the lawyers' Code of Professional Responsibility
or similar professional disciplinary rules.77
It remains to be seen whether this highly complex, refined
scheme designed to reconcile conflicting interests will succeed in
building public confidence that officials are not trading their influence and reputations for private gain. Courts tamper with the
scheme at their peril, however, for the lawmakers have declared that
if the provisions permitting partners to practice are struck down by
court action, then the entire package of changes in the conflict-ofinterest rules is nullified as well. 8
2. Post-employment Restrictions.- The need to slow down the
"revolving door" between government service and private industry
first became apparent at the federal level. Concern developed that
regulatory agencies were becoming "captives" of those they regulated, and that large government contractors, especially defense con72. See Chartock, Pay Hike Should Beget Full-time Legislators, Legislative Gazette,
June 1, 1987, at 25, col. 1; Miller, In Albany, Part-Time, Ethical Legislators, N.Y. Times,

May 23, 1987, at A29, col. 1.
73.

N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(10) (McKinney 1988).

74, Id. § 73(10)-(12).
75.

N.Y. LEGis. LAW § 80(8)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1988).

76. N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW § 73(10) (McKinney 1988).
77. Id. § 73 (1 1)(c); see also N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(13) (McKinney 1988) (providing that a submission to a state agency on a firm's letterhead does not become an "appearance" by a public official merely by reason of the fact that the official's name appears on the
letterhead).
78. See Ethics In Government Act, ch. 813, § 19, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404.
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tractors, were compromising the integrity of official decision-making
by routinely hiring recently-retired Government officials as their
agents. 9 Consequently, post-employment restrictions at the Federal
level are already substantial"0 and may soon be tightened further.81
States and localities have been slower to enter the area involving

the need to strike a balance between the desire to prevent influencepeddling and the fear of making restrictions so onerous that talented
individuals with high lifetime earning potential will shy away from
entering government service.8 2 In New York, the law prior to the
Ethics Act barred state officers and employees from appearing
before their former agencies within two years after leaving, with respect to matters with which the official was "directly concerned" and
in which he "personally participated. 8s3 The Ethics Act, recognizing
the realities of personal influence, extends the two-year ban to appearances before the employees' former agency with respect to any

matter at all.84 In addition, there is now a lifetime ban, instead of a
two-year ban, on lobbying in connection with matters in which the
ex-official personally participated while in Government.85
While prior law covered lobbying by former legislators, legislative aides were not covered at all.8 6 The Ethics Act purports to remedy this, but the remedy may be illusory. Former high-level legisla79.

R.

VAUGHAN,

supra note 13;

KNEIER, SERVING Two MASTERS:

A

COMMON CAUSE

(1976). The most recent scandal to rock Washington, D.C. involves the ongoing investigation of influence-peddling in the
defense industry by former and current government officials. See Shenon, Pentagon Inquiry is
Said to Include 3 Congress Offices, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
81. See 134 CONG. REC. S4236-67 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (Integrity in Post Employment Act, presently pending in Congress).
82. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., CITY CHARTER ch. 68, § 2604(h) (1986) (placing a
three-year post-employment ban on an ex-official's appearing, lobbying, etc., with respect to
matters "in which he personally participated, or which was under his active consideration, or
with respect to which special knowledge or information was made available to him as a result
of his city employment"); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE & CHARTER ch. 68, §2604(h)
(1986) (placing an eight-year ban on lobbying that is "against the interests" of the city). The
N.Y.C. Charter Revision Commission has proposed making the aforementioned three-year ban
a lifetime ban. The Commission also added a one-year post-employment ban on a public servant's appearance before his former agency, and a one-year ban on an elected official's or top
city executive's appearance before any agency in his former "branch" of government. NEW
STUDY OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION, DRAFT OF PROPOSED CONFLICT OF INTEREST

LEGISLATION FOR NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SERVANTS (June 10, 1988).

83.
84.

N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(7) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(8) (McKinney 1988).

85. Id.
86.

N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(7) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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tive aides will be barred from lobbying the Legislature in connection
with matters they directly and personally participated in while legislative aides, but this bar only applies during "the term of office of
the legislature in which he or she was employed. 81 7 Since the Legislature begins a new term after each biennial election, a chief committee counsel could resign from his legislative staff position in December, and begin work as a lobbyist in January, lobbying in
connection with the very same legislation that he shaped while committee counsel. This appears to mock the concept that an official
should not be able to sell "insider" access immediately upon leaving
government. To top it off, the bill exempts legislative employees who
"acted primarily in a supervisory capacity" from even this weak restriction."8 The use of a double standard for post-employment lobbying, with strict rules for executive-agency employees and loopholes
for legislative aides, appears to represent a clear case of self-interested bill drafting. One hopes this aspect of the Act will be revised.,
Finally, it should be noted that there are no restrictions on
"cross branch" lobbying. Ex-legislators may appear before executive
agencies, and ex-agency officials may lobby the legislature. This presumably should ensure that former public servants still have adequate employment opportunities open to them.
3. Financial Disclosure.- The disclosure section of the 1987
Act is probably its most elaborate, its most bitterly-contested and its
most salutary provision.
Detailed annual disclosures will be required, starting in 1989,
from candidates, from all elected officials and from all others in the
executive, legislative and judicial branches who earn more than
$30,000 per year9" or who hold "policy-making positions." 91 Unlike
the earlier, poorly-drafted statute9 2 which gave officials wide discretion in determining what financial information needed to be disclosed, if any, the Ethics Act dictates what is to be disclosed and
how. 93 Covered items include offices and directorships, including
87. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 78(8) (McKinney 1988).
88. Id.
89. One might imagine a situation in which a change in party control causes widespread,
sudden unemployment among high-ranking legislative aides, justifying an exemption from revolving-door restrictions, but the statutory loophole is not limited to this hypothetical case.
90. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73-a(l)(c)(iii) (McKinney 1988); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 211(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1988).
91. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73-a(l)(c)(iii) (McKinney 1988).
92. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
93. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 73-a (McKinney 1988) (requiring public officials to com-
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honorary positions; trade, business or professional positions; interests
in contracts with state or local government; political party offices;
sources of gifts and reimbursements; interests in trusts, excluding
trusts established by or for relatives; post-employment agreements;
deferred-compensation agreements; nature and sources of income, including deferred income; assignments of income; securities held; real
property held, excluding personal residences; notes and accounts
held; and liabilities.9 4 Items need not be reported when the amount
involved is deemed de minimis, generally less than $1,000.95 For
items that are reported, the exact amount of the items need not be
specified but a "category of value" must be reported. The "category
of value," however, unlike the rest of the disclosure form, is to be
kept confidential and shielded from public view.9 6 If a business activity of the reporting individual is either licensed or regulated by a
state or local agency, or did business with or had "other than ministerial" matters before a state or local agency as a "regular and significant part" of its business, then applicable state and local agencies
must be listed on the form.97 Where the official does not himself do
business with a state or local agency, but is associated with a firm or
partnership that does, the name of the state or local agency must
98
still be disclosed.
Officials who are partners in law firms must "give a general
description" of the "principal subject areas of matters undertaken"
by the firm.99 Real estate brokers and other licensed professionals
must do likewise. 10 0 Names of individual clients, customers or patients need not be listed.101 This provision represents a compromise
between drafters of the original Assembly bill, who sought disclosure
of the nature of specific clients' business before state agencies, 0 2 and
plete an extensive and detailed financial questionnaire).
94. Id. § 73-a(3)
95. Id. § 73-a(3). The exemption ceiling is $5,000 in the case of liabilities. Id. § 73a(3)(19).
96. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94(17)(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGIs. LAW §
80(16)(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
97. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73-a(3)(4) (McKinney 1988).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 73-a(3)(8).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Schmalz, Bill on Ethics Excludes Law Clients, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1987, at
B2, col. 1. Governor Cuomo supported the enactment of an even more explicit disclosure statement with respect to the identities of major clients. See Governor's Program Bill No. 220
(1986).
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legislators who claimed that any disclosure along these lines would
intrude upon the attorney-client relationship."0 3 The potential efficacy of the compromise language in deterring ethically questionable
representation is difficult to predict. Where an official's firm is engaged in a highly specific type of practice that is closely regulated,
cooperative conversions for example, the Ethics Act's disclosure
formula would be revealing. On the other hand, the law is less likely
to shed light on the ethical questions that arise when a large business
such as a bank, that has many types of matters pending before government, chooses to hire a lawyer-legislator to represent it with respect to portions of its business that appear to be non-controversial
in themselves, such as mortgage closings.104
Another contentious aspect of the financial disclosure debate
was the extent to which disclosure should cover financial interests of
spouses and children. In a significant victory for Governor Cuomo
and other reformers, the Ethics Act requires that income of an official's spouse be listed along with the official's own income. Unemancipated children as well as spouses are covered within the disclosure
provisions with respect to positions held, gifts received, interests in
government contracts, and interests in licensed or regulated businesses.10 5 Privacy concerns, affecting both officials and family members, are dealt with by the exemption provisions, which permit the
enforcement agency to delete from the public record any item on the
disclosure form which "will have no material bearing on the discharge of the reporting person's official duties." 10 6 The grounds for
exemption appear broader than an earlier draft of the bill which limited exemptions to matters which were of a "highly personal nature"
and "unrelated" to official duties.1 07 One hopes that the enforcement
agencies will not interpret the phrase "no material bearing" so liberally as to nullify the apparent strength and comprehensiveness of the
public disclosure requirements.
4. Coverage of Party Leaders.- Ethics laws have traditionally
governed the activities of public officials only. In fact, prior to the
103.

See Schmalz, supra note 102, at B2, col. 1 (reporting that Senate Majority Leader

Warren Anderson "repeated his position that it would be unethical for a lawyer to release a

list of his clients.").
104. See Dicker, Citibank Shocker, New York Post, Feb. 8, 1988, at 2.
105. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73-a(3)(5) to -(a)(3)(6) (McKinney 1988).
106. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 94(9)(h)-(i) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGIs. LAW §
80(8)(h)-(i) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
107. See N.Y.S. 4661, 210th Sess. (1987) (vetoed by Governor Cuomo), discussed supra
note 60.
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Ethics Act, there was only one New York statute of limited application covering political party officials in their party capacities.10 8 It
was the threat of scandal, once again, that propelled legislators in
this new direction. Stanley Friedman, a key figure in the New York
City influence-peddling prosecution that began in 1986, engaged in
his "racketeering enterprise" while holding no office except the
chairmanship of the Bronx County Democratic organization.la9 Recognizing that in jurisdictions where a single party is dominant, the
party leader may exert greater power and influence than the elected
officials whose nominations he engineers, both the State Democratic
Party and the Legislature moved to address this problem in 1987.1
The Democrats, trying to "deter and penalize misconduct by
party leaders without imposing needlessly burdensome restrictions on
party participation," approved a Code of Ethics"' stating that no
party leader shall use or try to use his position as a means of influence to secure any Government benefits for himself, relatives or associates that are not generally available to members of the public."'
Specific prohibitions, applying to party chairmen, officers and fulltime employees, as well as firms they own or control, interdict paid
lobbying of government agencies or legislative bodies in the party
leaders' jurisdiction." 3 Furthermore, the Code of Ethics prohibits
the sale or lease of goods, property or services to government agencies without competitive bidding, and the acceptance of gifts or other
things of value, including campaign contributions from a person who4
has financial interest in the outcome of a pending party decision."
It is noteworthy that the only expressed opposition to this Code came
from Democrats who argued that it did not go far enough in defining
prohibited conflicts of interest." 5
108. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 809 (McKinney 1986). Upon application for a zoning
variance or plat approval, there must be disclosure of any state or municipal official's affiliation

with the entity submitting the application. Id. § 809(1). In Nassau County, however, such
disclosure also applies to a "party officer." Id. § 809(3).

109. See United States v. Friedman, 1988 U.S. App. Lexis 8300.
110.

See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEMOCRATIC PARTY SPECIAL COMMITTEE

ON ETHICS 7 (Mar. 1987) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC PARTY REPORT]; see also Purnick, Panel
Seeks New Law On Finance of Officials, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1986, § 2, at I, col. 6; Governor's Program Bill No. 220 (1986).
111. The Code was drafted by a special party committee under the Chairmanship of
Theodore C. Sorenson and was adopted by the state committee on Sept. 30, 1987. See Lynn,
New York State Democrats Pass Ethics Code, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1987, at B3, col. 3.
112. DEMOCRATIC PARTY REPORT, supra note 110, at 13.
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id.
115. See Lynn, supra note 111, at B3, col. 3. These critics advocated a "flat ban on dual
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The Legislature's treatment of this question bears all the earmarks of political compromise. County chairmen and "county leaders" in counties of 300,000 or more, and any other county chairmen
or leaders who receive $30,000 or more per year in their party capacities, are governed by the same conflict of interest and financial
disclosure rules that apply to state officials and legislators. 1 6 In addition, county leaders in a city with a population of more than one
million, like New York City, are barred from doing business with
City agencies without competitive bidding, and are barred from representing private clients before City agencies.1 1 7 Party leaders in the
remainder of the state are left to their own devices and to local eth-

ics codes.' 18
The Ethics Act does not address what some perceive as the
problem of "dual office-holding," in which a party leader simultaneously holds public office, using the power of one position to buttress
the power of the other. Under existing law, the only offices party
leaders may not hold are judgeships and law enforcement positions.'1 9 The state's Democrats, prodded by Attorney General Robert Abrams,1 20 have moved toward barring party leaders from holding "executive" offices such as mayor or borough president,1 2' but
the Legislature has shown no signs of moving in this direction.
5. Administration and Enforcement.- For at least twenty-five
years, commentators have recommended that ethics statutes be ad-

ministered by agencies that have investigatory powers, can impose
sanctions, and most importantly, are independent of political influoffice-holding." Id.; see infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. Although the Code must be
adopted by each county committee before it can govern county leaders, state party leaders
believe local committees will readily comply. Id.
116. See N.Y. GEN. MUN.LAW § 810(6) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (defining local political party official); N.Y. PUB. OFF.LAW § 73(l)(k) (McKinney 1988) (defining political party
chairman).
117. See N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 73(4)(b) (McKinney 1988).
118. See Lynn, supra note I11, at B3, col. 3 (discussing the Act's failure to prohibit
dual office-holding thus allowing party leaders to represent outside interests).
119. See N.Y. PUB.OFF.LAW § 73(9) (McKinney 1988). For the purpose of this subdivision the term "party officer" includes a member of a national committee, an officer or member of a state committee, or a county chairman of any political party. Id.
120. Attorney General Robert Abrams has proposed that no party leader in a jurisdiction with a population of more than 10,000 may hold any elective public office. Attorney General's Legislative Program No. 149, at 15 (1988).
121. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the party's Code
contains a ban with a "grandfather clause" permitting current dual office-holders, such as
Brooklyn Borough President and Democratic Party leader Golden, to continue in office. See
Lynn, supra note 11l,
at B3, col. 3.
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ence. 122 According to one such commentator in 1963, legislative creation of an independent ethics commission with jurisdiction over all
branches of government "would take advantage of a temporary peak
in the legislature's reforming spirit by permanently entrusting this
spirit to a body less likely to let it die."' 23
Massachusetts did follow this advice a number of years later, 12
but few others have. Except where reformers have been able to bypass legislatures through an initiative process, lawmakers generally
have been unwilling to allow any agency they do not control to oversee their own behavior. 2 5 Independent "Boards of Ethics" exist in
many places, but play only an advisory role. 2 6 When enforcement is
at issue, the phrase "separation of powers" is frequently invoked to
justify lawmakers' refusal to surrender or share the power to discipline themselves.
The elaborate scheme created by New York's Ethics Act is a
case in point. The Act creates an independent Ethics Commission,
composed of five members serving staggered terms and removable
only for cause, but its limited jurisdiction covers only executive
branch officers and employees. 2 Legislators and legislative aides are
to be monitored by a "Legislative Ethics Committee" consisting of
eight legislators, four from28each party, to be appointed by the majority and minority leaders.'
When this Commission/Committee scheme was first proposed,
good-government advocates warned that the plan carried the seed of
paralysis. Specifically, the advocates argued that the politically divided Legislative Ethics Committee would be incapable of acting in
any matter which became a partisan issue, and would be unlikely to
act, except under pressure, in a matter with the potential to embar122.

See, e.g., Belford & Adams, Conflict of Interest Legislation and the Common
COMMON CAUSE, Aug. 1974, reprinted in THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 1

Cause Model Act,
(1975).

123. Note, Conflicts of Interest of State Legislators, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1232
(1963).
124. See MASS. GEN LAW ANN. ch. 268B, § 2 (West Supp. 1988) (enacted in 1978)
(providing for a state ethics commission).
125. Ohio and Florida are among the states with Ethics Commissions that act as administrative and enforcement bodies for all officials other than state legislators. See SOVERN COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at 62 (discussing the structure and configuration of
administration and enforcement bodies in other states which oversee their conflict-of-interest
laws).
126. Id. at 60-63.
127. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
128. N.Y. LEais. LAW § 80(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
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rass a powerful legislator or a large number of legislators. 12 9 Reformers suggested that if legislators genuinely believed that constitutional separation-of-powers concerns precluded merging the
Commission and the Committee, provision should at least be made
for the addition of one or more non-partisan "public members" to
the Legislative Ethics Committee. 3 0 In response, legislative leaders
agreed to create an "advisory council" within the Committee, consisting of three non-legislators and two legislators."3 " This council
has the limited duty of giving initial consideration to requests that
1 32
particular financial information be kept off limits to the public; it
has no role in determining whether sanctions should be imposed for
violations of the Act. Although "outside" members of the advisory
council are to be jointly nominated by the Assembly speaker and

Senate majority leader, there is no provision for the contingency that
would occur if politics prevented the two leaders from agreeing on

joint appointments. a3
Setting aside the legislature's failure to permit independent
oversight of lawmakers, there is much to admire in the Ethics Act's
carefully crafted administrative provisions. The Ethics Commission's
independence is enhanced by requirements that at least two of the
five members come from the private sector, and that none of the
members may be lobbyists or party officeholders. 4 In order to effectuate their duties, both the Commission and the Committee have investigative powers pursuant to which they may administer oaths,
129. See, e.g., Letter from New York State Common Cause to Speaker Melvin H.
Miller (May 1, 1987); Letter from Robert M. Kaufman, President of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, to the legislative leaders (Apr. 13, 1987); Letter from New York
State Common Cause to Governor Mario Cuomo (Apr. 10, 1987).
130. Letter from Robert M. Kaufman, President of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, to Governor Cuomo (Mar. 30, 1987) (recommending that there should be
a single independent commission with a structure designed to prevent domination by a single
party).
131. See N.Y. LEGis. LAW §§ 80(17)(a), (b) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The two legislators are the Chairmen of the Judiciary Committees in the Senate and Assembly. Id. §
80(17)(b).
132. Id. § 80(17)(g). If the advisory council denies a request that a particular item be
kept confidential, the "aggrieved" person may appeal to the full Legislative Ethics Committee.
Id. There is no corresponding provision for a member of the public to "appeal" a decision
against public disclosure.
133. See id. § 80(17)(b).
134. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The Attorney General and
Comptroller are each given the right to nominate one of the five members seated on the Commission; the others are to be selected by the Governor. Id.
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subpoena witnesses, and require production of records. 135 Detailed
procedures are created for the granting of exemptions from financial
disclosure requirements to individuals and to defined classes of persons.136 Equally detailed rules establish an adjudicatory process leading to the imposition of civil penalties up to $10,000 for those who
(1) knowingly and intentionally violate the conflict of interest rules;
(2) knowingly and wilfully fail to file an annual financial disclosure
statement; or (3) make false statements, knowingly, wilfully, and
with intent to deceive on financial disclosure statements.137 Provision
is also made for the enforcement bodies to issue advisory opinions
upon written request from a covered public official.138 As a rule, such
advisory opinions by the Commission or Committee are binding upon
the issuing body in any subsequent proceeding and shall be a defense
in any criminal or civil action. 139
The Attorney General has urged the legislature to modify two
40
other troublesome aspects of the Ethics Act's enforcement scheme.
First, in a step backward from current law, the Act permits criminal
prosecution for violation of its provisions only if the case is first referred to a prosecutor by the State Ethics Commission or the Legislative Ethics Committee.' 4' This "prior referral" requirement applies
not only to non-filing and false filing of financial disclosure forms,
but also to violations of the ban on practicing before state agencies
and other conflict-of-interest rules.142 Moreover, the enforcement
body must choose between imposing a civil penalty or referring the
135. Id. § 94(16)(c).
136. Id. § 94(9)(i); N.Y. LEGIs. LAW § 80(8)(i), (1) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Specifically, an individual may request an exemption from disclosing information relating to his or

her spouse or unemancipated children. N.Y. Exac. LAW § 94(9)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1988);
see supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. If the request is denied by the Commission,

the individual has the right to appeal his or her request for an exemption pursuant to the
detailed rule governing the adjudicatory process. Id. The individual may also request the Com-

mission to delete a particular item of information from the publicly available copy of the
financial disclosure statement. Id. § 94(9)(h).
137. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(13) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGis.
(McKinney Supp. 1988).
138.
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(15) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGIs.

LAW

§ 80(12)

LAW

§ 80(14)

(McKinney Supp. 1988).
139. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(15) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 80(14)
(McKinney Supp. 1988). Of course, the advisory opinion is not binding on the Commission
once it is amended or revoked.
140. See Attorney General's Program Bill, No. 160 (1988).
141. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(13) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGIs. LAW
(McKinney Supp. 1988).

142. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(13) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGIs.

LAW

§

80(12)

§ 80(12)

(McKinney Supp. 1988).
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matter for prosecution, as it cannot do both. 143 These restrictions are
wholly unprecedented, as the Attorney General states. 44 Many types
of unlawful conduct are subjected both to penal and to administrative sanctions. 4 5 Moreover, the requirement of prior referral may be
inconsistent with the State Constitution's provision that "[t]he power
of grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public officers ... shall never be suspended or impaired by law. 1 46
The second unfortunate aspect of the Ethics Act's enforcement
procedures is the blanket exemption from the open meetings and
freedom of information laws for most proceedings and records of the
enforcement agencies .1 7 Although no one could quarrel with the initial investigations into alleged violations remaining confidential, once
48
the enforcement body has found "reasonable cause to believe"'
that a violation has occurred, the purpose of the Ethics Act would
best be served if subsequent adjudicatory hearings, and records of
them, were presumptively open to the public. This would better balance legitimate privacy interests with the public's right to be informed about the workings of government.
IV.

PROPOSED EXTENSIONS OF THE ETHICS ACT

One area that deserves further consideration in an analysis of
the Ethics Act is its limited reach beyond Albany. Far more public
corruption has occurred in New York State's counties, cities, towns
and villages than in the state capital. Although the Ethics Act con143. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94(13) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 80(12)
(McKinney Supp. 1988). Violations relating to disclosure forms are relatively "new" crimes,
but violations relating to prohibited conflicts of interest have always been prosecutable by local
district attorneys. See Attorney General's Legislative Program, No. 160, at 2 (1988).
144. Attorney General's Legislative Program, No. 160 (1988) (opining that the prior
referral requirement, together with the bar to the use of both civil and criminal sanctions,
removes teeth from the legislation).
145. For instance, a police officer who assaulted a suspect could be prosecuted for assault and official misconduct. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 1987) (assault in the
third degree); id. § 195.00 (official misconduct). A police officer may be removed from the
force as a result of departmental disciplinary proceedings. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75 (McKinney 1987).
146. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see also Attorney General's Legislative Program, No.
149, at 4 (1988) (proposing an amendment to the Ethics in Government Act which would
delete the requirement of prior referral before permitting criminal prosecution).
147. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 94(17) (MeKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. LEGis. LAW § 80(16)
(McKinney Supp. 1988); see also Attorney General's Legislative Program, No. 149, at 4
(1988).
148. See N.Y. LEGis. LAW § 80( ll)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
94(12)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
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tains extensive amendments to the General Municipal Law, and creates a "Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics", 149 it does not promulgate an ethics code for city, county or local
officials. 50 Other than the aforementioned restrictions on political
party chairmen, the only substantive provisions of the Act affecting
local government relate to financial disclosure. Counties, cities,
towns and villages are given until January 1, 1991, to adopt their
own financial disclosure forms.' 5 ' If they fail to do so, then after that
date their elected officials, officers and employees, and local political
party leaders will have to complete the same financial disclosure
form that state employees must complete.' 52 However, only in New
York City must the local disclosure law "be at least as stringent in
scope and substance" as the state's law. 153 Other covered localities
may continue to use their existing disclosure forms or may opt for
new forms that are either more or less comprehensive than the
state's, both in terms of who must disclose (e.g., party leaders may
be excluded) and in terms of what must be disclosed. 54 The only
clear implication from the complicated statutory language is that
continued citizen vigilance will be necessary to ensure adequate local
compliance with the spirit of the disclosure requirements.
The notion that local governments should retain the flexibility to
adapt their conflict-of-interest rules to local conditions has considerable merit.'55 The part-time nature of public service in many smaller
149. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 813 (McKinney Supp. 1988). The nine-member commission, to be in existence from 1989 through 1992, is given essentially the same powers and

duties as the State Ethics Commission with regard to enforcing the disclosure requirements,
insofar as they apply to officials of local governments which have not vested the enforcement

function in their own boards of ethics. See id. § 813(13).
150. A few limited conflict-of-interest rules, narrower than the Ethics Act's provisions,
are already mandated for local officials. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 800-813 (McKinney

1986 & Supp. 1988); see also supra notes 44-46 (discussing some of the conflict-of-interest
rules governing in New York City and Long Island).
151. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 811(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
152. Id. This rule applies only to political units with populations of 50,000 or more. Id. §
810(1).
153. Id. § 811 (1)(a) ("In a city with a population of one million or more, such local law
... shall be at least as stringent in scope and substance as the provisions" complied with by
state civil servants, set forth in § 812).
154. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 812(3) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The City of Troy,
one of the first to amend its ethics code in response to the Ethics Act's directive, has chosen to
adopt the state's disclosure form in toto for its own officials. TROY, N.Y., CODE No. 2 (Feb. 25,
1988).
155. See SOVERN COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 8, at 57-58 (discussing
the Commission's recommendations on New York City's conflict-of-interest and financial dis-

closure law). California has created one of the strongest independent state ethics commissions,
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political subdivisions places them on a different footing than New
York State and New York City with their thousands of workers. On
the other hand, strong personal relationships play a particularly powerful role in the workings of smaller local governments, and these
strong relationships offer particularly tempting opportunities, in the
wrong hands, for favoritism and undue influence. Therefore, the Attorney General reasons, local officials should be subjected to conflictof-interest rules at least as strict as the rules for state officials. 156 For
instance, local officials should not be able to appear before local
agencies in their own jurisdiction or in any jurisdiction that geographically coincides with it. 15 7 As an illustration, "an employee of
Town A located in County X could not appear before any government agency of either Town A or County X."'" Post-employment
rules would also apply at the local level, thereby preventing such
practices as a defeated Town Supervisor joining an engineering firm
to render services to the town pursuant to a contract he negotiated
59
while still in office.
Other similar potential extensions of the Ethics Act might expand coverage to political subdivisions with as little as 10,000 in
population, rather than 50,000, and extend coverage to local party
leaders who do not receive $30,000 in annual compensation or reimbursements. 60 Local officials could be barred from doing business
with, or appearing before, state agencies, on the theory that the dynamic nature of politics makes it unrealistic to think that one level of
government can be insulated from another. Conversely, state officials
could be prohibited from appearing for compensation before local
agencies, in view of the potential for special influence that arises
from the degree of control that state government has over local government budgets.
Various "loophole-closing" amendments have been suggested in
earlier portions of this article.'' Two additional areas deserving exthe Fair Political Practices Commission, which has an annual budget of $3.4 million. See
generally CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION, supra note 28, at 11. Each California locality
is permitted to adopt its own ethics code subject to approval by the Commission to ensure that
the local code is consistent with general state standards. Id.
156. See Attorney General's Legislative Program, No. 149, at 1 (1988).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 3.
159. Interview with Frank R. Fioramonti, Assistant Attorney General in charge of Legislative Bureau, New York City (Feb. 9, 1988) (on file at Hofstra Law Review).
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 89, 130-33, 147-48 and accompanying text.
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amination involve receipt of gifts, and the activities of legislative
employees.
The Ethics Act continues the restriction in prior law on the
amount that a public official may accept in gifts "under circumstances in which it could reasonably be inferred that the gift was
intended to influence him, or could reasonably be expected to influence him, in the performance of his official duties ....-62 Accord-

ing to the New York City Bar Association, gifts under such circumstances are "repugnant in concept;"163 thus, one would think they
should be banned, not just restricted in amounts to $75. Moreover,
the broad application of this rule illustrates its practical shortcomings in terms of enforcement. Any large gift from a lobbyist, or from
a person seeking a contract from an official's agency, or from a person who recently received a "discretionary" benefit from the official's
agency, is inherently suspect. At the risk of cutting off a few gifts
which truly result from "friendship" rather than favor-seeking, there
should be an outright ban on gifts to officials from persons in such
categories, above a nominal amount.6
Finally, one might ask whether the existing hortatory rule that
an official may not accept outside employment "which will impair
his independence of judgment in the exercise of his official duties"' 5
should be translated into a specific injunction that key legislative
aides may not receive compensation from any person, firm or association that has a direct interest in legislative decisions that the aide is
in a position to influence. It may be unrealistic to expect the Legislature to enact any further restrictions on its own policy-making employees. In all fairness, the Ethics Act covers legislative aides more
forthrightly than the ethics laws of many other jurisdictions.16 6 Nev162.

N.Y. PUB. OFF.

LAW

§ 73(5) (McKinney Supp. 1988). The Ethics Act, however,

increased the permitted value of such gifts from $25 to $75. See id. § 73 at 127 historical note
to § 73(5).
163. Letter from Robert M. Kaufman, President of the New York City Bar Association,
to Honorable Melvin H. Miller, speaker of the New York State Assembly (Mar. 30, 1987)

(discussing the first version of the Ethics Act that was eventually vetoed).
164.
ADMIN.

This position was adopted in Nassau County's ethics code, NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y.,

CODE § 22-4.2 (1964), and recommended by both the Sovern Commission, see

SOVERN COIMMISSION

see

RECOMMENDATIONS,

FEERICK COMMISSION DRAFT,

supra note 8,at 51, and the Feerick Commission,

supra note 46, at 7.

165. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 74(3)(a) (McKinney 1988).
166. The type of "revolving door" restrictions extended to New York's legislative aides
by the Ethics Act would be applied to Congressional aides for the first time if Congress adopts
the pending Integrity in Post Employment Act. 134 CONG. REC. S4236-67 (daily ed. Apr. 19,

1988); see supra notes 17, 80-89 and accompanying text.
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ertheless, some high-level aides, persons who are counsel to major
committees, have been implicated in glaring conflicts of interest. One
influential aide serves simultaneously as a committee counsel, as
counsel to a major political party, and as counsel to private firms
that frequently have applications pending before local government
agencies. 117 The Act's disclosure requirements will shed long-awaited
light on these conflicts, but disclosure alone is insufficient. The spirit
of the Ethics law requires that the top Assembly and Senate staffers,
who are paid as well as their counterparts in civil service, owe the
same undivided loyalty to the public. One hopes that in the not far
distant future, the Legislature will overcome the pulls of partisanship
and seriously address this issue.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ethical rot in government is nothing new. Exposures of corruption have sparked surges of reform for as long as anyone can remember. Ultimately, the character of the citizenry will determine the
character of public life. In the 1987 Ethics in Government Act, New
York's Legislature set a standard of behavior, and fashioned tools
that can be used to maintain the standard. While imperfect, the Act
is a detailed, well-crafted document that reflects much credit upon
its creators. What is currently needed, however, is that the public
outrage that impelled the Act's passage be transmuted into sustained
attention. By learning and applying the Act's tools, we can improve
on its form, and assure that its spirit lasts.

167. Thomas Spargo, counsel to the Senate Elections Committee, also serves as counsel
to the State Republican Party, and represents private developers who recently made campaign
contributions to local candidates in a small upstate city while they were seeking the city's
permission to build a major shopping center. His role in possible election law violations is
being investigated by the Feerick Commission. Lynn, Ethics Unit Investigating Elections
Board, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1988, at B3, col. 1.
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